ABSTRACT Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an innovative solution in the cryptography world to prevent the information leakage that can sometimes be deliberate. Several QKD protocols were recently presented for building a secure shared key, of which the BB84 protocol is one of those interesting protocols. The authentication between the communicating parties is one of the issues that cause a huge argument. Furthermore, the current well-known QKD protocols are not yet ready to realize the personality of either the sender or the receiver, although the QKD protocol is already protected by the rules of physics and quantum mechanics to detect any interruption. This paper introduces a new QKD protocol that utilizes two quantum channels to provide authenticated communications for legitimate parties. Moreover, the proposed QKD protocol uses two type of physical behaviors, entanglement and superposition states. The entangled states are utilized to confirm the authentication between the end users, while the superposition states carry the secret key that will be shared between the users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The outflowing of massive amounts of information through miscellaneous communication channels (non-quantum channels) causes an absence of critical shared information between legitimate users by illegal actions. Classical (conventional) communication is a brief submission of digital data (0 or 1) through unsecure channels (e.g. Internet). Moreover, several algorithms [1] - [4] have been presented in the classical communication that are indeed able to prevent information leaks, as well as withstand against some information attacks. These algorithms are secure as long as the quantum computer is not publicly available. On the other hand, quantum cryptography essentially provides a large physical foundation of information security for shared data and communications, even when the quantum computer is found. However, the quantum cryptography faces critical challenges presented either in quantum attacks or through natural noises. Preventing these challenges requires a robust secret key builder that is made by a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Protocol. The QKD protocol is a mechanism that assists two or more legal users to initiate a shared secret key (SSK). This secret key is the only way to encrypt and decrypt the shared data into a secure environment. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard invented the quantum key distribution protocol [5] , [6] , which is called BB84 protocol. Thenceforth, several quantum key distribution protocols were presented such as B92 protocol [7] , SARG04 protocol [8] , EPR protocol [9] , Coherent One Way (COW) protocol [10] , KMB09 protocol [11] , S13 protocol [12] , and Deferential Phase Shifting (DPS) protocol [13] . These QKD protocols are considered the most appropriate mechanisms at least so far.
Moreover, there are some QKD protocols that were physically implemented and demonstrated successful results. Xi-Han Li, Fu-Guo Deng, and Hong-Yu Zhou (2009) proposed a single-photon transmission scheme [14] , where the scheme uses only single-photon states to reject errors. Two phases were applied to obtain the relevant outcomes, where is no basis mismatch. The first phase requires the receiver only to perform single-photon measurements for obtaining the outcomes used for distilling the private key, and it will not require to switch the choice of the measuring bases. The second phase is a quite similar to the BB84 except the predominant basis is only used to distill the key bits.
Recently, P. V. P. Pinheiro and R. V. Ramos announced a QKD protocol (CT-DPS-QKD) that is protected by a two-nonorthogonal state [15] . The CT-DPS-QKD protocol contains two layers; the first layer represents the QKD protocol process, and the second layer is a two-state phase, which protects the process in the first layer. The protocol was designed to be robust against Eve presence by utilizing a Qubits Error Rate (QBER) estimation in the first layer and analyzing the quantum state in the second layer. Furthermore, it is secure against beam splitter, intercept-resend, photon number splitting, unambiguous discriminations, external control and Trojan horse attacks.
Principally, any quantum key distribution protocol utilizes two different channels that are based on the quantum channel to submit quantum bits (qubits) for data transmission and the classical channel to exchange regular bits for confirmations and reconciliations (such as the BB84). Each communication channel in the QKD protocol is initiated in various environments, where these environments specify the used platforms and quantum tools such as transformers and detectors [16] , [17] . The quantum channel should utilize either Fiber-Optics or Free-Space to transfer a qubit into an elementary particle from a communication side to another, whereas both sides cannot be totally protected from eavesdropping attempts. Additionally, by using quantum mechanics, quantum communications are unconditionally secure [18] . In addition, the rules of physics, especially Non-Cloning theory, keeps the whole communication system unbroken, where any illegal party will be detected if an eavesdropper tried to tap or clone the submitted information.
Through using the polarization of particles (n dimensions of photon states), as well as the mechanism of measuring particles (quantum tools), the stability and efficiency of each QKD protocol were evaluated by Abushgra and Elleithy [19] . Furthermore, the determined stability and efficiency will never be approved without identifying the legal users. So, fulfilling an authentication between two or more legitimate communicators is one of the cryptographic challenges that prevents missing information; otherwise, the communicators cannot identify each other. This paper presents an improved QKD scheme that is designed to include users' authentication within an entangled channel. Also, the presented QKD algorithm is technically processed into two quantum channels; one channel is an EPR channel (entangled states channel), and the second channel is a quantum channel (qubit channel in superposition). The proposed QKD scheme will be terminated when the required authentication between the communicated parties of the EPR channel fails.
II. PREPARATION PHASE
This phase contains two required methods, which should be completely done by Alice (One of the communicators or the sender). Both methods also are complementary to each other, FIGURE 1. The prepared matrix DM after calculating the length of X into three sections is: (|∅ lower triangle, |ϕ upper triangle, and |ω diagonal line, where the upper-triangle equals the lower-triangle (Notice: there is no similarity in the DM cells, it is just to show the differentiation between the matrix sections).
where the first preparation is never approved without setting the second preparation and vice versa. One assumption, in this proposed QKD scheme, is that Alice is the trusted sender party who will provide the proper information without cheating.
A. THE QUBITS PREPARATION BY THE SENDER
To create a shared secret key (SSK), Alice should know X (an original plaintext) that will be transferred to Bob (One of the communicators or the receiver). Primarily, the original plaintext X should be converted to a string of bits (data), and Alice then converts the string of bits to quantum bits (qubits). The converted plaintext is established by passing each single-bit (bit ∈ {0, 1}) into a qubit converter (from regular bit to a unit vector in the Hilbert space 2 ). Next, Alice sets up the converted qubits into a lower-triangle of a designed matrix (DM) as illustrated in Figure (1.a) . The designed matrix will match the length of the original plaintext (n-qubits) based on calculating the DM as follows:
(1) where DM is the size of the prepared matrix (usually columns equals rows), and n is the length of the converted plaintext (n-bits) that Alice wants to share with Bob. Furthermore, Alice will fill up the upper-triangle (the diagonal line is not included) with random qubits (well-known bits converted to qubits states e.g. |ϕ ) as shown in Figure (1.b) . These random qubits will be utilized as decoy states in the reconciliation phase between the legitimate users. The reconciliation phase in the proposed protocol is included in the first phase of the communication, not as a separate phase, which is well-known in several QKD protocols and initiated after exchanging qubits. Therefore, the entire matrix will be totally prepared except where the diagonal line is present. Then Alice can adjust the diagonal line's cells based on the summation of each row as shown in Figure (2) . If the summation of a chosen row is odd, Alice will add the state of |1 to the empty cell (×) (e.g. (3)) to make the row even. On the other hand, if the summation of a row is even, the state of |0 will be added to the matrix cell I ROWI . Hence, Alice will prepare the entire matrix with all even rows as shown in Figure ( 2). The previous diagonal line will become a confirmation between the users as parity cells, as well as an extra protection against Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks [20] . However, when Bob measures the upcoming qubits, he will know if the upcoming qubits were interrupted by either eavesdroppers or the environment.
Each row of the prepared matrix I ROW (as above in e.g. (3)) should have an even number as a total summation of elements; then the empty cell (diagonal cell e.g. (×)) will be signed either in a state of |0 or |1 . Based on the Equation (3), the diagonal state |× will be signed as a state of |0 because the total of |1 's states is now equal to the total of |0 's states. This procedure should be similarly applied for the entire designed matrix DM (DM A ∈ {I ROW 1 I ROW 2 I ROW 3 . . . I ROWN ). Therefore, Alice has a set of rows (indices number I ROWN ) that will be submitted later to Bob during a quantum channel. This submission requires picking up random indices of matrix rows from the prepared matrix DM, and then inserting each row sequentially based on the random chosen indices in one string I QUBIT . Therefore, the string of qubits I QUBIT will be emitted into a quantum channel, where each prepared qubit will be polarized into a superposition state (|× or |+ ).
Finally, the previous string of qubits I QUBIT will not be successfully applied before preparing the EPR communication through the entangled channel (EPR channel). Because Alice already has enough details of the needed information from the prepared data of the DM A , she will begin another phase based on qubits preparation. Moreover, Alice will prepare another communication with Bob to approve the authentication as well as the sharing of reconciliation details.
FIGURE 3.
The content of string I EPR after being prepared by Alice, where the initiated communication time is at the left side; then some collected data will be formatted based on the preparation phase, and the package will finish at termination time.
B. THE EPR PREPARATION BY THE SENDER
Initiating an EPR connection should be executed by submitting one of the four EPR particles (Entangled states | ± , | ± ) [21] to Bob as shown in Equation (4, 5) . Moreover, the proportion of submitted EPR particles will be fully related to the qubits preparation in DM A (as in section II. A). More precisely, the EPR submission will reflect some specific parameters (elements of I EPR ) that are extracted from the original plaintext X after the qubits preparation. The submitted EPR string I EPR contains encoded parameters, which are considered an open key for the whole QKD scheme. Also, the encoded parameters will be inserted into a one designed string (package) as shown in Figure ( 3). These parameters involve a sequence of information such as initiation time (t 1 ), the number of matrices (N ) (if any), matrix size (DM), parity diagonal (p), state dimension (s), matrix indices (R), and termination time (t 2 ). Therefore, the EPR channel will never be effective without the proper preparation of the previously mentioned parameters (A).
In conjunction with these parameters, the initiation and termination time (t 1 , t 2 ) are calculated by a timer, where it clicks at the beginning of expected process time and then at the end of submitting the string I EPR . The number of prepared matrices N (if any) is decided by Alice, where N is sometimes more than one (N ≥ 1). Next, the size of prepared matrix DM will be determined by Alice based on the length of plaintext n-qubit as in Equation (1), which is prepared (as in section II. A) to create the string of I QUBIT . The parity diagonal (p) depends on the row's summation as shown in Figure ( 2), and Equation (3), where p is a sequence of added spin photon either |0 or |1 state diagonally from up to down. The polarized state (s) is also made by Alice, where she can use more than a two-dimensional (Arbitrary) state during the qubit submission. Lastly, the matrix indices (R) obtains the row indices in the DM after being mixed up (I ROW 1 , I ROW 2 , I ROW 3 , . . . I ROWN ), where the receiver can realize the right type of received rows reflected in one string I QUBIT .
The whole string of entangled qubits I EPR is submitted to Bob into an EPR channel, where the entanglement is a basis-independent property. The source of emitted entangled photons should be either Alice (a trusted sender) or a trusted third party (if needed). Based upon the measurement of EPR photons, both users can initiate a quantum communication in safe mode, where the utilized entanglement state with two particles A, B, will be measured by four Bell states as an orthonormal basis. Moreover, the measurement of the received states will be one of the Bell states | i AB , with a probability given by a squared overlap | i | AB | | 2 .
III. SUBMISSION PHASE A. EPR COMMUNICATION
In 1935 [22] , Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen wrote a paper that opened an incredible argument about wave function and incomplete quantum mechanics. The major notion of the EPR Pair Paradox [23] explained a photon's submission from a trusted source to different two well-known destinations as shown in Figure (4) . The particle measurement, in the case of no interruption, will demonstrate a different non-orthogonal state at each destination. Moreover, if Alice received |0 state, Bob should have received |1 state that can be confirmed by one of the communicators after the measurement. The presented QKD algorithm is essentially initiated by creating an EPR communication after the EPR preparation, where the steps of EPR submission will be described as follows:
• Alice creates n string of entangled photons (| , | ), where she keeps one photon in a quantum memory. Another photon will be sent to Bob into an EPR channel, which is prepared as I EPR string (as in section II. B).
• At the same time, Alice creates an unknown particle (e.g. |ϕ = α| 0 +β|1 ), which is in a superposition state.
• TENSORING both an entangled state as well as an unknown-state (| ab ⊕ | ϕ c ) produces a threedimensional photon state that will be prepared by Alice. The entangled photons emit from the source of EPR states that is considered from the trusted sender to two (2) different directions, and then the collapsed state will be the opposite state of the measured state.
• Alice splits the three states without measurement, where |ϕ abc will become | ac and |ϕ b .
• After measuring the broken | ac and |ϕ b states, separately, | ac becomes entangled, and |ϕ b is in superposition.
• Based on the known state of the photon that Bob will receive, Alice submits a pair of classical bits (00, 10, 01, or 11) sequentially into a classical communication (unsecure channel) to inform Bob about the utilized quantum gates [24] . Whereas, the requested authentication between the communicating parties will be incorporated into the previous submission of I EPR between Alice and Bob, the identification and EPR confirmation should be either approved or disapproved. If it was approved, Bob should use the informed quantum gates as well as the proper photon states. Conversely, if it was disapproved, Alice and Bob mismatched the I EPR string and therefore ends the existing communication and begins a new line of communication. Furthermore, the I EPR string will be well-known by both users and protected by the Non-Cloning theory as shown in Figure ( 3). The security of the EPR communication is proved in [25] - [27] , where the advantage of the proposed protocol is considered in needless for storing entangled states for a long time, unlike [28] .
Similarly, if the communication is confirmed by Alice and Bob and the secret key is obtained, the One-Time-Pad (OTP) will be applied, which is considered a prime example of perfect secure cryptosystem. The OTP uses a random and uniform of the chosen n-qubit secret key SSK ∈ {0, 1} n to encrypt (and decrypt) the n-qubit plaintext X ∈ {0, 1} n with a simple XOR-operation.
Additionally, the prepared quantum gates are simply classified as a unitary gate, X gate, Z gate, and X-Z gates as shown in Equation (6) . In classical channel, these gates are the only communication processes that Alice and Bob need in order to share portions of data. This classical channel will be unsecured communication that should be initiated after preparing the I QUBIT and I EPR .
As mentioned above in Equation (6) (|0 −|1 ) for H |1 . These quantum gates will provide accurate measurements for Bob, and there will be no doubt about the obtained qubits.
B. QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
After ensuring Bob received an I EPR string (as in section III. A), both users start to exchange the prepared qubits (data) in the DM A into a quantum channel as shown in Figure ( 2). The submitted qubits will be created in one string by two bases V i (| × , | + ) and four states S i (|0 , | 45 , | 90 , and | 135 ). The string of qubits I QUBIT contains a sequence of random rows of DM A , where the DM A = DM B (the DM B is the matrix that is setup by Bob after receiving the whole upcoming string I QUBIT from Alice.). Next, Alice establishes a quantum connection to send the prepared plaintext I QUBIT (qubits in superposition states) to Bob. Then, Bob will use the well-known Pauli-matrices (σ x , σ y , σ z ) based on the received String I EPR to measure each upcoming qubit sequentially [29] .
The measurements should have a low rate of QBER (% of uncovered qubits) because Bob has already agreed to the EPR confirmation (I EPR ) that includes the measurement instructions. Moreover, the mechanism of data organization during the matrix setup will assist both users to protect qubits from two common quantum attacks, the Man-In-Middle (MIMA) [30] , [31] and the Intercept-Resend (IRA) [32] , [33] attacks. Therefore, Bob can realize any changes of the received qubits. He also can figure out the expected errors by setting up the diagonal decoy states p.
FIGURE 5.
The whole mechanism of the proposed scheme in two quantum channels, where EPR channel is an entangled submission, classical channel is Internet or other unsecure communications, and quantum channel is photon submission in superposition states.
The entire secret key process between the communicated parties is shown in Figure (5) , where Alice and Bob primarily can initiate an EPR communication to exchange entangled FIGURE 6. The received qubits were inserted from left to right and up to down sequentially (DMB) by the receiver. The qubits will be mismatched with the prepared matrix (DMA), which is impossible to be detected by an eavesdropper.
states [34] . If the EPR communication succeeded, then both parties can start exchanging polarized data (qubits) to create a secret key. When Bob receives the upcoming qubits as one string I QUBIT , he will insert the qubits to a matrix (or certain matrices) as shown in Figure (6 ). The received one string I QUBIT will correspond to the length of the original plaintext n-qubit, where the entropy of the shared secret key (SSK) should be the same length as the entropy of the original plaintext X.
Also, inserting the received qubits I QUBIT into a matrix is based on the ordered indices in DM from I EPR , where it starts at I ROW1 and ends at I ROWN . Then, Bob will insert upcoming qubits sequentially in each row from left to right (or from I ROW 11 to I ROW 1N ). If Bob completed and received the I QUBIT string at a certain time t 2 , the whole obtained matrix (D MB ) should be completely unmatched with DM A as in Figure (6) . Accordingly, Bob will use the row indices R (included in I EPR ) to insert each row of DM B in the proper sequence, where the R is the sequence of indices of DM A . Since the DM B was sorted row by row, Bob will obtain the DM A as shown in Figure (7) . Hence, Bob establishes the first available examination by using the parity states p that requires diagnosing the flipped states. More precisely, Bob counts each row individually, where the summation of each row I ROWN should be an even number as mentioned above. If each row of the received DM has an even summation, Bob will be confident about the received qubits. Otherwise, if there is any odd row, Bob will check the parity cell with high probability of finding the error location.
IV. MATHEMATICAL PHASE
To establish a stable communication between the communicated parties, there are some mathematical operations that should be accurately applied. These operations relate to theories found either in quantum physics or the fundamentals of computer science. Whereby, Alice starts to prepare VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 7. The modified matrix is based on EPR communication I EPR , where Bob will obtain the prepared matrix by Alice (DMA). The error rate (QBER) is very small with ability to make a correction.
the regular bits that are already extracted from the original plaintext X. The preparation of the plaintext X includes placing each bit (and then qubit) in a certain matrix cell, and this cell is assigned by a unique index tag based on the arrangements of matrix cells I ROW ij .
In addition, the size of matrix DM will be divided into three very important sections such as in Figure (1) : an upper-triangle for decoy states (random bits), a lowertriangle for data (plaintext), and a diagonal line for parity states (correction and reconciliation phase). Based on the previous matrix setup, Alice creates an Open-Key string I EPR that will be submitted through entangled states (EPR channel). This string (as shown in eq. 12) includes prepared elements to configure the setting of upcoming communication into a quantum channel. The prepared elements will be created as follows:
• Initiation time t 1 reflects a start click's time of the emitted first photon.
• Number of matrices n (if any) is used by Alice to prepare I QUBIT (by default n = 1).
• Matrix size DM is based on the plaintext X length.
• Parity diagonal p is a changeable cell based on the summation of each row.
• State dimension s is considered optional for using certain polarized states instead of orthogonal states (by default).
• Matrix indices R are a string of the row's indices after the preparation of DM A .
• Termination time t 2 is a click's time of the submitted last photon.
Although the submission of an entangled state is a separate process that occurs during many sequential steps, this process is never successfully applied without a qubit preparation as shown above (as in section II. A) . Here, Alice sends two regular bits [bit 1 bit 2 ] into a classical channel (e.g. the Internet or telephone) to inform Bob about the used quantum gates. These bits were indicated in section (III. A). Next, the combination of Alice's submission of I EPR string will be a particle of entangled states as illustrated in Equation (13) and a particle of unknown states as illustrated in Equation (14) .
where |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. Alice then makes a TENSOR ⊗ measurement between the initiated entangled states | AB and a random unknown state | ϕ C as follows:
Additionally, TENSORING entangled and superposition (unknown) states produce one photon in a three-dimensional state | ⊗ ϕ ACB . If Alice extracted the first and the third states | AC without measuring as in Equation (17), the concluded states will reflect another entangled state. Also, the other state |ϕ B will be separated or will become a superposition state.
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Then, the original entangled state | AB will be disjointed, and the unknown state |ϕ C will become an entangled state. Also, Alice will absolutely know the polarized state that was already submitted to Bob (rectilinear or diagonal). Therefore, Alice and Bob can share the needed information about the utilized quantum gates. A classical channel will simply transfer four types of quantum gates, while each quantum gate will be represented by two regular bits. These quantum gates will be sequentially demonstrated as follows:
|11 −→ X and Z gates (21) The previous quantum gates (19, 20, 21, and 22) provide an access to measure the upcoming polarized photons of I QUBIT , where the right chosen quantum gate will produce the right state of the photon measured by Bob. Hence, Bob should agree after the EPR communication occurs, on either opening a new quantum connection or starting the EPR connection over. At this point, Alice and Bob are totally aware if the received qubits of I EPR were compromised by the environment or an eavesdropper. If both users accepted the I EPR string, Bob gets the suitable state measurements, which provide a guarantee for creating a secure shared key with the possibility of a slight error rate (QBER). This QBER should never exceed the 0.15 of the uncovered qubits of the SSK length.
The whole strategy of the proposed protocol is illustrated in Figure (8) , where the EPR communication is highlighted on the right side and the Qubit communication is highlighted on the left side. In essence, the authentication approval should be confirmed during EPR communications. Subsequently, the transfer of the qubits I QUBIT through the quantum channel will be the last step in the exchange of data in order to create a shared secret key (SSK).
As shown above in Algorithm (1), the proposed QKD algorithm contains three important loops. These loops represent the main operating functions that are based on EPR preparations, EPR communications I EPR , and qubits submissions I QUBIT . A and B represent the sender and receiver sequentially. The EPR preparation time also will not be included during the whole Runtime-Execution, where the plaintext X should be prepared by A to extract the needed information for the EPR submission. The prepared information will be sent into entangled states (EPR channel).
If the EPR communication was applied successfully,
A and B will start to exchange qubits through the quantum channel.
Next, the submission of a qubit into the quantum channel will occur after the identity confirmation of communicating parties. Finally, the proposed QKD protocol was designed to accomplish this authentication during the prepa- ration of qubits submission. This process typically occurs by legitimate communicators when both scenario non-cloning theorem and qubit teleportation are present. The participants can end the connection early when the EPR communication fails. Therefore, both communicating parties will not share any important data even if the EPR communication failed, so that the Runtime-Execution will be reduced. This is unlike the most well-known QKD protocols, where if the quantum communication frequently failed, the end users will not detect any warning. Here, the reconciliation phase is utilized after sharing the whole plaintext's qubits, which is the reason that many QKD protocols extend the Runtime-Execution [35] .
V. MEASUREMENT PHASE
The proposed QKD protocol was experimented with wellknown cryptography methods (i.e. Efficiency, Simplicity, and Security Measurements) [36] , and it was also simulated with existing noises related to environmental disturbances as in Figure ( 9, 10) [37] , as well as eavesdropping attacks [38] . A noise applied either by an eavesdropper or the environment, to one of the communication channels assumes flipping a state of a photon in a random method. The noise will pick a random submitted photon to apply the Hadamard gate (H ) [39] , [40] that should be invisible even to the end users. It also produces a correlation with the quantum 
FIGURE 10.
The signal corrupted with Zero-Mean Random Noise is applied to the proposed protocol with 1024 qubits length.
FIGURE 11.
The correlation between the submitted and received qubits for 256 qubits length was measured after applying a natural noise that is considered in a random rate.
system. Bob, however, can realize the flipped photon's states that are not related to the sender's confirmation I EPR (as in section III. A). Moreover, Bob can figure out any eavesdropping that comes from a physical tapping or the environment, although the submission of both I EPR and I QUBIT has been received successfully by Bob. The parity technique and the power of organizing a matrix DM will detect any dubitable attempts. Also, quantum mechanics is present even in the case of an attempt to uncover the submitted qubits (non-cloning theorem). Therefore, both noise providers have been treated by the receiver without any leaks of information. Moreover, the proposed QKD protocol was examined during a photon's submission to illustrate the correlation between the submitted and received qubits during a stable connection. Thus, the non-correlation between the submitted and received qubits as in Figure ( 11) explains that Eve cannot get any advantage of interrupting the communication, because the prepared DM A by Alice will not correspond with the received DM B by Bob. In addition, Alice and Bob will immediately detect this interruption, although Eve sometimes gets un-sorted data in the worst-case scenario. In other words, Eve may hamper getting a secret key by interrupting the communication several times, where these interruptions mean initiating other connections from the beginning between the users, but Eve never gets the original plaintext X. The several communications adversely require an extra Runtime-Execution, as well as a new preparation that affect significantly the efficiency of the QKD protocol. However, the information (plaintext X) that should be shared between the legitimate users will be harmlessly stored, and the eavesdropper will not gain any worth of data.
Correspondingly, the current measurements were processed in a classical system, where some unique quantum libraries were applied to emulate the gap between the classical and quantum platforms. These libraries (QCF, QETLab, QLib, and Qubit4MATLAB) [41] - [44] were designed to handle a single qubit in a superposition, as well as functions that measure the qubit in the space (e.g. threedimensional X, Y, and Z). According to the aforementioned discussed QKD protocols (BB84, B92, SARG04, EPR, COW, KMB09, S13, and DPS), some needed measurements for end users will be applied. These measurements include a security communication of the QKD protocol, key distillation, and RuntimeExecution. The security of the QKD protocol is indicated by the security function J (k) [45] as shown in Equation (23) . Moreover, measuring the QKD security reveals the uncovered qubits compared with the covered qubits during one submission as illustrated in Figure (12) . Each QKD protocol will naturally be impacted either by an eavesdropper or the environment. This impaction could cause a loss or delay of information, where key distillation or QBER is a scenario to adjust the covered and uncovered qubits during the communication between Alice and Bob. Lastly, the Runtime-Execution is a critical aspect of the whole QKD protocol operations, where it can be a major reason for either successfully approving the QKD protocol or rejecting the whole QKD operations.
Moreover, the security measurement reflects the rate of uncovered qubits between the end users during the qubits submission, where the high rate of uncovered qubits represents a high security of the communication and vice versa. Since the end users measure the distributed key by quantum states S i , they cannot be certain about the security of communication. More precisely, the sender cannot realize if the state of photon was received by the receiver without any interruption. In this case, both users should release some qubits to check if there is no eavesdropping during the qubits exchange. This scenario of security measurement is very commonly used in the key distribution protocols although the proposed QKD protocol uses a built-in scenario to detect the uncovered qubits. Therewith, the security functions in Equation (23, 24) can be used at the end of Bob adjustment of DM B , where Bob and Alice should share the same string I QUBIT at the end.
where log represents the natural logarithm, k is the number of uncovered bits, and n is the plaintext length. The S(k) defines the entropy of security function, which was announced by Shannon in 1948 [46] , [47] . The definition of entropy is an average of security for a secret key when the k in the entropy of security function is always equal to n e (i.e. = 2.71828). Accordingly, the maximum of entropy in one of the submissions of the proposed QKD protocol measurement is approximately around 37%, when 53% of the key is uncovered as illustrated in Figure (13) . starts at 32 qubits with showing a slight difference. Otherwise, the measurements show significant variations, when the number of qubits increases as shown in Figure (14) . Moreover, the proposed protocol shows a slight increase when a number of qubits rises. On the other hand, the thresholds appear to be going up sharply if the qubits increase.
Finally, the covered/uncovered qubits during the submission of I QUBIT were examined by calculating the QBER [48] of the proposed QKD protocol as well as the thresholds (the average of measured QBE's protocols) [49] . The result exhibits an absolute variation between both the proposed QKD protocol and thresholds as shown in Figure (15) , where the rate of uncovered qubits is around 79% of the initiated qubits in the proposed QKD protocol. This contrasts with the threshold of well-known QKD protocols that shows 60% of the initiated qubits.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed QKD scheme presents an improvement of distributing a secret key between two legitimate parties, which is essentially created into two quantum channels. An EPR channel (confirmation channel) uses entangled states, which has a low rate of risk in limited usage. The second channel is utilized to transfer certain qubits in superposition states from the sender to receiver with an ability to detect any interruption. This ability is verified by the non-cloning theorem, as well as the proposed technique. Generally, the proposed QKD scheme provides an authentication between legitimate parties, unlike the most well-known quantum key distribution protocols. The authentication is approved during a data preparation phase before exchanging the plaintext. Moreover, the authentication will be confirmed into a quantum channel, not into a separate phase. In addition, the proposed QKD protocol has used a slight classical communication when end users share quantum gates, and this classical communication will not impact the whole proposed QKD scheme even if it was interrupted. Since the authentication is approved, the sender uses a qubit preparation into a matrix (or matrices if any), which is considered an effective procedure to ignore PNS and IRA attacks.
Furthermore, the proposed QKD scheme has demonstrated stability against the Man-In-The-Middle (MIMA) attacks, where there is no chance to impersonate the sender or the receiver. This is approved by the non-correlation of the shared data between the sender and receiver. Later, exchanging qubits (converted plaintext) through a quantum channel after approving EPR communication will be a forward procedure, where both users submit and receive qubits in superposition states. At the end, the proposed QKD protocol gained many features either by providing an authentication during quantum communication or by utilizing well-known methods to protect data loss such as a parity decoy. The RuntimeExecution was improved, especially, when the shared plaintext goes larger. Finally, the QKD protocol improved parameters against well-known QKD protocol including efficiency, security, and Runtime-Execution.
